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the Massachusetts Community & Banking Council Experience  
by Kathleen Tullberg
On October 24, 2000, over 100
bankers and community leaders
convened at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston to mark the tenth
anniversary of the Community
Investment Program and the for-
mation of the Massachusetts
Community  & Banking Council.
The Massachusetts Community &
Banking Council brings bankers
and community groups together in
a partnership to consider issues of
importance to both groups. The
partnership has led to the accom-
plishments and lessons learned dur-
ing the past ten years that are dis-
cussed in this article.
Background: Community
Investment Program
In 1990, when community leaders
and the Massachusetts Bankers
called for changes in federal, state,
and city laws.  
But it was also a year in which
more than 200 bankers and com-
munity representatives devoted
substantial amounts of time,
effort, and commitment to devel-
oping long-range responses to
community needs. A series of
three public forums, co-hosted by
the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston and the Massachusetts
Banking Association, led to agree-
ment among all parties that a
comprehensive solution was need-
ed. Following the forums, bankers
established task forces to address
four areas of concern identified by
community leaders: mortgage
lending, affordable housing devel-
opment, access to bank services,
and economic development. The
Community Investment Program
Association announced agreement
on a new $400 million Community
Investment Program, the attitude of
many bankers and community
leaders was one of cautious opti-
mism. The previous year had been
one of discord, denials, demands,
tension, and controversy. It started
with the release of a Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston study on
the effectiveness of the Community
Reinvestment Act and Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act and
included the release of two other
mortgage studies showing lower
levels of mortgage lending in
Boston’s minority neighborhoods.
Community groups held demon-
strations and sit-ins at bank
branches and charged banks with
lending discrimination and neigh-
borhood disinvestment. They made
bank application challenges,
demanded more bank loans, and
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ation and reaching agreement. By
the time the program was
announced, both sides had learned
a lot about the other. Community
leaders learned the basics of bank-
ing and came to appreciate that
bankers wanted to address the
issues. Bankers learned about com-
munity needs and were comforted
that community leaders shared
their objective of long-term pro-
gram viability. Since 1990, changed
relationships have improved the
way banks and community organi-
zations work together and have
significantly influenced the devel-
opment of new programs and
activities. Today, rather than
adversaries, bankers and commu-
nity leaders generally describe
their relationship as one of part-
nership and collaboration. 
MCBC: The First Five
Years
Of all the organizations established
by the CIP, the Massachusetts
Community  &  Banking Council
(MCBC) was perhaps the most
ambiguous but the most ambi-
tious. Its original mission state-
ment called for it to serve as a
research and policy center whose
purpose would be to promote
community investment in minori-
ty and low- and moderate-income
communities. MCBC would also be
responsible for “coordinating,
monitoring, and evaluating” the
Community Investment Program.
MCBC would serve as a permanent
point of contact between bankers
and the community. With a board
of directors composed of nine
bank and nine community repre-
sentatives, MCBC was a forum at
which bankers and community
members could meet on a regular
basis to discuss problems, antici-
pate needs, and formulate initia-
tives. MCBC would help avoid cri-
sis management and, it was hoped,
promote cooperative relationships.
Like its sister corporations, MCBC
was originally intended to serve the
entire state, and at its onset, more
than 150 banks across Massa-
chusetts joined. MCBC’s statewide
ambitions were boosted by a suc-
cess recorded even before its incor-
poration. Community advocates
had identified check cashing as a
major problem, especially for inner-
city residents. Without bank
accounts or access to banking facil-
ities, residents were often forced to
rely on check-cashing establish-
ments to meet their needs—often at
considerable cost. In the spring of
1990, MCBC orchestrated an agree-
ment with more than 200 banks
across the state to cash checks for
welfare recipients who did not have
bank accounts. A year later, again
in cooperation with the state’s wel-
fare agency, the program was
expanded to include a direct-
deposit component.
The cooperative spirit of the CIP was remarkable
because community representatives saw the banks, at
best, as inattentive to neighborhood needs and, at worst,
as guilty of lending discrimination. Bankers, stung by the
charges of discrimination and mindful of a softening
economy, were wary of the community’s demands.
Alerting the unaware, MCBC uses a friendly touch to talk about serious subjects.
(CIP), developed by the bank/com-
munity task forces, included the
establishment of the Massa-
chusetts Community & Banking
Council; loan and equity funding
for two new organizations, the
Massachusetts Housing Invest-
ment Corporation and the Mas-
sachusetts Minority Enterprise
Investment Corporation; and bank
commitments for mortgage lend-
ing, new branches, and automated
teller machines.
The cooperative spirit of the CIP
was remarkable because communi-
ty representatives saw the banks,
at best, as inattentive to neighbor-
hood needs and, at worst, as guilty
of lending discrimination. Bankers,
stung by the charges of discrimi-
nation and mindful of a softening
economy, were wary of the com-
munity’s demands. Banks were
used to competing with one anoth-
er, not cooperating. They also dif-
fered considerably in their experi-
ence with community representa-
tives and programs. For some, the
inner city represented a new mar-
ket. For others, it was a way of
expanding ongoing efforts. Major
differences existed among the
community representatives as well.
For example, advocates for mort-
gage programs and bank services
were not sure that community
development corporations, already
bank customers for housing proj-
ects, shared their priorities.  
What all the parties shared, how-
ever, was a commitment to negoti-5c  &  b
Despite its initial success in devel-
oping a statewide program,
MCBC’s focus quickly began to
narrow to Boston-based issues.
During 1991, MCBC convened a
task force to oversee the 1990
commitments to establish bank
branches in underserved Boston
neighborhoods. The 1990 agree-
ment called for nine new branches
and 32 new ATMs. In a series of
meetings that brought together
bankers, government officials,
community advocates, and resi-
dents of inner-city neighborhoods,
attempts were made to identify
areas of the city most in need of
bank branches. The meetings
opened up the process of branch
siting to neighborhood advocates
and ordinary citizens. By 1995,
nine new branch offices, three loan
production offices, and 47 ATMs
opened in the Boston neighbor-
hoods of Dorchester, Jamaica
Plain, Mattapan, Roxbury, and
Lower Roxbury/South End.
While the bank and ATM place-
ments were reaching a successful
conclusion, MCBC found itself
embroiled in another banking prob-
lem, the second mortgage/home
improvement scam. The press and
community leaders had uncovered
evidence that banks were financing
private-mortgage companies and
home-improvement contractors
who, in turn, were charging inner-
city customers high interest rates
and/or performing substandard
work. A subsequent study by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston in
1991 confirmed the complaints—
and revealed that some rates were
as high as 18 percent. Further,
more of these high-rate loans were
being made in minority communi-
ties than in non-minority areas.
The Fed reported that high-rate
mortgages were supplied by a rela-
tively small number of specialized
lenders. The Fed stated that banks
were not providers of high-rate
second mortgages but that major
Boston banks at times provided
financing to some of the high-rate
lenders or purchased loans from
them. Many of the banks immedi-
ately dropped affiliations with
questionable mortgage firms and
offered aid to victims of the
unscrupulous lending and home-
improvement schemes by develop-
ing individual restitution plans.
Several community-based organi-
zations began documenting alleged
abuses and, in many cases, negoti-
ated resolutions with the borrow-
ers, secondary lenders and, in some
cases, banks. 
In October 1992, MCBC launched
the Victim Resolution Program
(VRP) as the joint community-
bank response to the disclosures.
The VRP formed mediation panels
composed of bankers, community
While MCBC provided a forum for
addressing the problems of branch
locations and mortgage-lending
abuses, these initiatives also
strained MCBC’s resources and
limited its ability to follow through
on plans for statewide research
and educational programs. Many
banks saw MCBC as increasingly
focused on Boston issues. And
after the first year, MCBC saw its
membership from non-Boston
banks drop. Even as they with-
drew, however, the banking com-
munity outside the Boston area
recognized the value of joint bank
and community organizations in









advocates, and trained mediators
who screened complaints, identi-
fied abuses, and resolved disputes.
The mediation panels screened
nearly 400 complaint calls, result-
ing in the filing of more than 180
complaints. Nearly half of the
claims were deemed eligible, with
20 percent of those resolved
through the program.
open. In cities such as Pittsfield,
Lawrence, New Bedford, Cambridge,
and Fitchburg, multi-bank loan
pools and consortia were created
to address community needs. In
some of these areas, bank and
community forums, most mod-
eled after MCBC, were estab-
lished to provide a regular meet-
ing place for bankers and com-munity leaders to discuss local
issues and needs.
A Change in Focus
In 1993, MCBC formally changed
its operating structure, in recog-
nition of its focus on Boston and
its dwindling budget. Full-time
personnel were replaced by in-
kind staff support provided by
member banks and MCBC com-
mittees, and outside consultants
were relied on for identifying new
issues. Despite the changed geo-
graphic focus, some of MCBC’s
work continued to have statewide
relevance. In June 1994, MCBC
launched  Basic Banking for
Massachusetts, the third compo-
nent of its basic banking services
initiative (see below).
By the second half of the decade,
MCBC found its new focus. Its four
standing committees—affordable
housing, banking services, eco-
nomic development, and mortgage
lending—were each co-chaired by
a bank and a community repre-
sentative. Each was responsible for
developing individual programs
and activities that responded to
needs identified by participating
banks and organizations. A part-
time manager was hired to coordi-
nate and facilitate committee pro-
grams. MCBC simplified its mis-
sion and expanded its geographic
focus to include all of Greater
Boston. Tom Callahan, Executive
Director of the Massachusetts
Affordable Housing Alliance
(MAHA) and vice chair of MCBC
and its Mortgage Lending Com-
mittee, says of the changes in
MCBC’s organization and focus,
“Community groups wanted MCBC
to monitor all of the Community
Investment Program agreements,
but banks wanted it to be a dis-
cussion table. It’s now a little of
both. If MAHA or any other com-
munity organization has a broad
issue regarding banks, they can
bring it to the MCBC table. Banks
can do the same. In those cases,
MCBC can act as a neutral forum,
either just to provide a table for
discussion, information-sharing,
or problem-solving or, in some
cases, to take on projects that
everyone agrees would be helpful
but that no individual bank or
organization is willing or able to
take on alone.”
Today, MCBC’s committees (which
are open to all) take on a wide
variety of community credit and
banking issues. The column  at far
right provides examples.
How to Build a Working
Partnership
MCBC has learned from its grow-
ing pains, and these lessons can
apply to a variety of partnership
organizations. Here are some tips:
Have the right people at the table
While MCBC’s board of directors
includes bank presidents and com-
munity executive directors, partic-
ipants in MCBC committees are
likely to be loan originators, pro-
gram directors, and CRA officers—
people who are actually involved
in local program implementation,
have direct customer contact, and
can share information on real
problems and real needs. These are
the people who can make changes
happen. The front-line emphasis
not only provides more practical
information, it also helps banks
and community representatives
do their jobs better. Margaret
Harrison, vice president at Mellon
New England and co-chair of
MCBC’s Mortgage Lending Com-
mittee, says, “There is an interest-
ing dynamic that takes place at
MCBC’s Mortgage Lending Com-
mittee. We have people from
banks, community organizations,
state, city, and federal agencies,
even nonbank lenders. It is a good
place to share information. Some
Added to the voluntary welfare check-cashing and direct
deposit programs, Basic Banking for Massachusetts was
designed to make it easier for low- and moderate-income peo-
ple to establish banking relations. The program established
guidelines developed by bankers and community representa-
tives. For checking accounts, the guidelines called for a maxi-
mum monthly charge of $3.00 and a minimum of eight free with-
drawals a month. For saving accounts, the guidelines called for
a maximum monthly charge of $1.00. Both accounts had low
minimum opening deposit requirements. 
In the first year, 130 banks signed on to the Basic Banking for
Massachusetts program. As of 2000, 151 banks, representing
over 77 percent of all branch locations in the state, provide
checking and savings accounts that meet the Basic Banking for
Massachusetts guidelines. Twenty-four other banks provide
either a checking or savings account that meets the guidelines.
Basic Banking for Massachusetts has proved to be a statewide
remedy to a need identified by MCBC. 
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information that comes from the
meetings is used by banks and
other agencies to develop their
own programs.”
Listen to member needs
MCBC committees and activities
reflect needs identified by com-
mittee participants. Different com-
mittees, participants, and issues
have resulted in varied agendas. In
1995, MCBC published Changing
Patterns, its first study of mort-
gage-lending patterns in Boston,
as part of its report on the
progress of the mortgage initia-
tives that had been developed in
1990. Tom Callahan says that the
report proved to be particularly
valuable for smaller banks and
community organizations. Says
Callahan, “The report is a good
monitoring tool for the communi-
ty by helping us track the progress
we have made in expanding
homeownership and in identifying
new issues. The bigger banks that
participate in MCBC have the
resources to do these mortgage
studies on their own, but the
smaller banks do not. The reports
help them develop mortgage lend-
ing products and policies.” On the
Committee’s recommendation,
MCBC has published annual
update reports and has expanded
the geographic focus of the report
to include all of Greater Boston. 
MCBC’s Affordable Housing
Committee agenda also reflects a
gap identified by committee mem-
bers. Esther Schlorholtz, senior
vice president at Boston Private
Bank  & Trust Company and a
member of MCBC’s board of direc-
tors, recalls, “A couple of years
ago, we asked members of
[MCBC’s] Affordable Housing
Committee what kind of role the
committee should play in helping
to support affordable housing.
After all, we don’t do lending and
we don’t develop housing. They
told us that it would be helpful for
the committee to serve as an infor-
mation exchange, a place to keep
up with new initiatives and
changes in old programs.” With




Committee continues to serve as
a forum for information-sharing
on affordable-housing issues. As
part of this effort, the Committee
regularly hosts speakers from




Committee, with the active par-
ticipation and support of the
Massachusetts Division of Banks
and the Massachusetts Bankers
Association, continues to pro-
mote  Basic Banking for
Massachusetts. The Committee
also works to expand access to
consumer-education programs,
especially for residents currently
utilizing check-cashing estab-




ment Committee, including city,
state, community, nonprofit,
and business representatives,
continues to identify ways to
leverage public and private
resources to support business
development. As part of this
effort, the Committee published
its second Small Business
Financial Resource Guide in
1998. The Guide was distributed
to banks, business assistance
organizations, and small-busi-
ness owners throughout Greater
Boston to help them find the
right kind of assistance to meet
business needs. In May 1999,
the Committee distributed a
self-assessment tool on Y2K
issues developed specifically for
small-business owners. In June
2000, MCBC published its first
study of small-business lending
patterns in Boston and neigh-
boring communities.
continued on next page
invites speakers from a wide vari-
ety of organizations and agencies
to each meeting. Over the past
year, speakers have included
representatives from the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban
Development, Citizens Housing and
Planning Association (CHAPA),
City of Boston’s Department of
Neighborhood Development, Lynn
Community Development Housing
Corporation, Greater Boston Inter-
faith Organization, Massachusetts
Life Insurance Community Invest-
ment Initiatives, Massachusetts
Housing Partnership Fund, Boston
Community Capital, Massachusetts
Housing and Shelter Alliance, and
other groups. Featuring speakers,
says Schlorholtz, “helps keep peo-
ple well informed and, in several
cases, has identified opportunities
for collaboration.”
Be attentive to emerging issues
and marketplace changes
New information and changing
times can provide new opportuni-
ties for action. In 1990, the mort-
gage-lending issue was largely
defined as one of lending to
African-Americans. MCBC’s first
mortgage-lending study in 1995
showed significant gains in lend-
ing to African-Americans but little
progress in expanding homeown-
ership to Latinos. MCBC responded
by establishing a task force on
Latino mortgage lending, to identi-
fy barriers for Latino homebuyers
and to develop strategies to
increase the number of mortgage
applications from Latinos. While
the task force recommendations
laid out specific steps that banks,
community organizations, and
MCBC could take to help address
the problem, the process provided
even greater insight to committee
participants. Margaret Harrison
recalls, “We at MCBC came away
with a greater understanding of
what the issues were. It opened up
the discussion. Going forward,
reaching other populations will be
a goal.” More recently, MCBC
responded to lenders’ aggressive
marketing campaigns urging
homeowners to consolidate their• MCBC’s Mortgage Lending
Committee works with the
Massachusetts Housing Partner-
ship (MHP) Fund to track perform-
ance of the Soft Second Mortgage
Program, in an effort to identify
ways that banks and community
organizations can work together to
avoid foreclosures. As of June
2000, Soft Second mortgages had a
delinquency rate of only 2.3 per-
cent, as compared to a 2.6 percent
delinquency rate for all mortgage
loans in Massachusetts.
• In 1997, the Committee estab-
lished a task force on Latino mort-
gage lending to learn more about
the barriers to homeownership for
Latino residents and to identify
ways that banks and community
organizations could help to expand
those opportunities. In 1998,
MCBC sponsored focus groups
with Latino residents and surveyed
Latino community organizations
on the issue of mortgage lending.
In March 1999, MCBC published
and distributed the task force’s rec-
ommendations for bank and com-
munity action to more than 350
banks, community organizations,
and public officials. A final report
from the task force was issued in
April 2000.
• In 1998, the Committee estab-
lished a Refinance Subcommittee to
consider ways to assist homeown-
ers facing financial difficulties. In
March 1999, MCBC hosted a meet-
ing of local banks to share infor-
mation on the need for flexible
refinance loans. A few months
later, MCBC published a directory
of foreclosure-prevention counsel-
ing services in Greater Boston to
assist community organization and
banks in making appropriate cus-
tomer referrals.
• MCBC announced the Boston
kickoff of “Don’t Borrow Trouble,”
a public information campaign to
help educate homeowners on refi-
nance and foreclosure-prevention
issues in December 1999. MCBC
will begin implementation of the
program statewide in early 2001. 
• In January 2001, MCBC published
an update of its earlier publication,
Changing Patterns, which looks at
mortgage lending patterns in
Greater Boston and the impact of
targeted mortgage programs in
offering homeownership opportu-
nities to low- and moderate-
income residents. Over 400 copies
of Changing Patterns VII were dis-
tributed to bankers, community
organizations, housing advocates,
and public officials. A new com-
panion report on subprime refi-
nance lending will be published in
early 2001.
Mortgage Lending
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MCBC Committee Work continued
credit card loans by the develop-
ment of “Don’t Borrow Trouble,” a
public awareness campaign to alert
homebuyers to the risks of certain
refinance loans.
Expand programs through collaboration
While MCBC’s board of directors
consists solely of nine bankers and
nine community representatives,
participation in committee activi-
ties has expanded to include
dozens of other public sector, non-
profit, community, advocacy, and
bank representatives. This results
in more resources and opportunity
for building on, spinning-off, and
expanding programs. MCBC’s
“Don’t Borrow Trouble” campaign
is a prime example. MCBC was
able to solicit pro bono advertising
assistance to develop the cam-
paign. All campaign materials
were developed with the participa-
tion of community, bank, and
public members of MCBC’s
Mortgage Lending Committee. The
City of Boston partnered with
MCBC in the production of the
campaign materials and in
launching the program in Boston.
The Massachusetts Division of
Banks provided a toll-free number,
enabling MCBC to launch the pro-
gram statewide. The Massa-
chusetts Bankers Association
incorporated “Don’t Borrow
Trouble” as part of its own cam-
paign on predatory lending and
provided financial support for
both the Boston and the statewide
programs. Fannie Mae, Freddie
Mac, the Massachusetts Mortgage
Association, and the Massa-
chusetts Mortgage Bankers
Association provided financial
support. A wide variety of banks
and community organizations lent
their support in getting the mate-
rials out to homeowners. Margaret
Harrison says, “[We at] MCBC
couldn’t have developed and
implemented the program on our
own, but we are in a good position
to bring other people to the table
who share our concerns.” 
Collaborations have also enabled
other organizations to update or
extend programs. For instance, the
City of Boston updated MCBC’s
Small Business Financial Resource
Guide and made it available to
small-business owners at the
Boston Empowerment Center.
CHAPA expanded on the work
of MCBC’s Home Counseling
Directory by putting information
about home-counseling agencies
online, and the Homeownership
Collaborative developed a home-
buyer counseling curriculum and a
certification program to help
ensure the quality of homebuyer
counseling. Discussion on neigh-
borhood commercial real-estate9c  &  b
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development, initiated by MCBC’s
Economic Development Committee,
has been continued and expanded
by the Local Initiatives Support
Coalition and the Massachusetts
Housing Investment Corporation.
Conclusion
MCBC strives to build on its
strengths by serving as a neutral
forum for identifying and address-
ing community credit needs and
by taking on projects that no sin-
gle bank or community organiza-
tion will tackle. Once dominated
by the largest Boston banks,
MCBC’s membership and commit-
tee participation has expanded to
include many more small- and
medium-sized banks. For such
banks, which often have limited
staff, MCBC provides a manage-
able way to maintain contact with
community leaders. They also gain
comfort from the oversight MCBC
provides on particular programs.
Banks new to the Soft Second
Mortgage Program know that
MCBC is monitoring its activity
and, therefore, feel more comfort-
able joining the program. Banks
wanting to respond to community
demands for affordable bank prod-
ucts can participate in Basic
Banking for Massachusetts and
know that they will meet commu-
nity expectations.
MCBC’s first ten years have pro-
duced useful products and pro-
grams. What is equally important,
however, is the role it has played
since 1990 in helping to change the
relationship between bankers and
community leaders in Greater
Boston. Those changes are signifi-
cant. They have altered the way
banks and community organiza-
tions work together and they have
influenced the development of new
programs and activities.  
Going forward, the challenge for
MCBC and its bank and communi-
ty members will be to recognize
and respond to new issues. In
1990, the issues focused on the
need for more bank lending and
investment in low- and moderate-
income and minority neighbor-
hoods. While that overall goal has
not changed, the marketplace cer-
tainly has. The initial focus of
increased mortgage lending to
African-Americans has been
expanded to include growing
Latino, Asian, and other immigrant
communities. Community efforts to
expand the availability of afford-
able housing have been joined by
the need to preserve existing units.
The cost of housing is a growing
concern. The financial marketplace
has changed as well. Banks have
merged and private mortgage com-
panies now make more than 50
percent of all home mortgages in
Boston.  Credit card companies and
out-of-state banks now make near-
ly 50 percent of all small-business
loans in Suffolk County. And, there
is the issue of the digital divide. In
this complex environment, active
participation by bankers and com-
munity leaders, working together
as part of organizations like MCBC,
will be the key to continuing the
progress that has been made in
meeting the community develop-
ment needs of low- and moderate-
income neighborhoods.perspectives on 
Credit Scoring and 
Fair Mortgage Lending
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redit scoring is an underwriting
tool used to evaluate the credit-
worthiness of prospective borrow-
ers. Utilized for several decades in
granting certain forms of con-
sumer credit, scoring has come into com-
mon use in the mortgage lending industry
only within the last 10 years. Scoring
brings a high level of efficiency to the
underwriting process, but it has also raised
concerns about fair lending with regard to
historically underserved populations.
To explore the potential impact of credit
scoring on mortgage applicants, the
Federal Reserve System’s Mortgage Credit
Partnership Credit Scoring Committee is
producing a five-part series of articles.
This is the second. An important goal of
the series is to provide the industry and
concerned groups and individuals with the
opportunity to comment on issues sur-
rounding credit scoring. The first article,
which provides a context for the issues to
be discussed in the series and gives further
background information on the Mortgage
Credit Projects, can be found in the Spring
2000 issue of Communities & Banking on
the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston at www.bos.frb.org/comaff/html/
c&b.htm#spring2000.
This article incorporates statements
requested from representatives of three
organizations, selected because of their
interest in and differing perspectives on
credit scoring and fair lending. 
Lending institutions face various
pressures in the course of their
credit operations. They must con-
sistently achieve and increase
profitability, comply with a com-
plex regulatory framework, and
contend with new sources of com-
petition. An institution’s loan
underwriting policy, and, in partic-
ular, its credit-scoring model,
reflect the institution’s appetite for
risk, targets for profitability, and
role in serving the credit needs of
its market. 
Credit-scoring models have predic-
tive power; they give lenders the
ability to expeditiously assess the
likelihood of borrower default.
There is general agreement that to
retain their predictive power, mod-
els must be maintained and adjust-
ed to reflect changes in loan per-
formance and in market demands
and demographics.  In addition,
observers argue that absent proper
maintenance, a lender risks using a
model with diminished predictive
capability, which may produce an
unjustifiable disparate impact on
prohibited basis groups.1
From your perspective and experi-
ence, what can lenders do to
ensure that the credit-scoring
models they develop or purchase
will accurately predict the per-
formance of their applicant base?
What steps might lenders take to
effectively update and maintain
their models? Finally, what meth-
ods should lenders employ to mon-
itor the performance of their cred-
it-scored loans, particularly with
respect to the fairness and accura-
cy of their models?
Each representative for this
article received a request to
comment on the following text: C12 c & b
Along with the pressures to
increase profitability, comply with
complex regulatory requirements,
and contend with new and ever
more aggressive sources of compe-
tition, mortgage lenders, like other
businesspeople, must also manage
rapid change in technology. In the
lending arena, this change is evi-
dent in the approval of loans
through automated underwriting,
made possible in part by the use of
credit scoring. The past few years
have seen a dramatic increase in
the use of credit scoring in mort-
gage lending, yet there is substan-
tial anecdotal evidence that credit
scoring may not be a particularly
responsive tool for the low- to
moderate-income borrower.
Credit-scoring proponents point to
the speed, accuracy, and fair treat-
ment it brings to the lending
process, but credit-scoring models
require regular maintenance, test-
ing, and updating to reflect chang-
ing market conditions, without
which both lender and borrower
will suffer. Nonetheless, it appears
that some lending institutions rely
on scoring models with limited
predictive power, and they miss
significant business opportunities
as a result. 
NHS of Chicago’s direct lending is
targeted to low- to moderate-
income (LMI) neighborhoods and
borrowers. Many of these commu-
nities did not, until fairly recently,
have a neighborhood banking or
lending branch. The primary
providers of credit to many resi-
dents were financial entities that
were aggressive in pursuing LMI
borrowers; today, many of them
would be characterized as sub-
prime lenders. Because credit-scor-
ing models factor in the types of
credit used by a borrower in the
past (and subprime credit has a
negative impact on the score),
many borrowers from these neigh-
borhoods may be adversely affect-
ed when dealing with a conven-
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scores. Further, my own observa-
tion of credit scores of first-time
buyers and LMI homeowners is
that negative factors have an
immediate effect on scores, while
positive factors influence the score
much more gradually.  
Supporters of credit scoring also
maintain that its use frees the
lender to more closely examine the
marginal borrower and spend the
time and effort necessary to close
the loan. At NHS, though, we have
seen too many situations where
credit scoring has actually been
used to limit access to first-tier
credit. In the Spring 2000 issue of
the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston’s  Communities  &  Banking,
Calvin Bradford argues that the use
of credit scoring does not always
result in more underwriting time
being spent on applicants with
marginal credit but may actually
serve as a tool to identify candi-
dates for higher-cost loans. Absent
proper maintenance of a scoring
model and its underlying assump-
tions, and without diligence to
ensure its fair application across all
applicants, credit scoring could fur-
ther widen the gap between low-
and high-income borrowers. 
I believe that scoring models’ pre-
dictive power is worse for low-
income borrowers than it is for the
average mortgage applicant. NHS
understands and appreciates that
the acquisition of a home and the
opportunity to thereby build both
financial and social wealth is a
powerful incentive. I do not
believe that any credit-scoring
model factors in the emotional
impact of potential homebuyers
when they are the first members of
their families for generations to
own a home or buy a home in the
newly revitalized neighborhood in
which they grew up. Human judg-
ment is still essential in weighing
these factors. And as Peter
McCorkell of Fair, Isaac &
Company, Inc. states in the article
mentioned above, the scoring
models most often used in mort-
gage lending were not specifically
designed to assess mortgage risk.
Lending institutions that use cred-
it scoring to identify customers
who would benefit from a second
look, prepurchase, or credit coun-
seling are to be applauded. With
government-sponsored enterprises
such as Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac currently offering products
with more flexible terms for the
credit-challenged borrower (such
as Fannie Mae’s Timely Payments
Rewards product), lenders can
offer conventional pricing more
readily than before.
Credit scoring proponents further
maintain that a primary benefit of
scoring is that it increases people’s
access to credit. I take this to mean
that its primary goal is to provide
credit that is reasonably priced
and without excessive fees or bur-
densome loan terms. To reach this
goal, all parties with a vested
interest in the activities of lenders
using credit-scoring technology
need to ensure that the credit-
scoring tool is working as effec-
tively and fairly as possible. While
a scoring system may be devel-
oped on the basis of statistics, the
developers’ role cannot be
ignored. Just as lending institu-
tions and secondary-market
investors are held to a standard of
fairness, scoring-system develop-
ers should share in the obligation
to ensure that their models do not
unfairly exclude borrowers.
It has been our recent experience
that lending institutions most sen-
sitive to the needs of LMI borrow-
ers are increasingly those institu-
tions that rely less on credit scor-
ing and more on individual assess-
ment of the borrower. Community
lenders (such as NHS) that are
focused on LMI neighborhoods
have an understanding of the local
environment and neighborhood
dynamics, and they provide com-
petitively priced mortgages to LMI
borrowers in considerable volume.
For national lenders, this kind of
hands-on approach is not feasible.
An underwriter in St. Louis cannot
be expected to know and under-
stand the characteristics of a buyer
and a property on the West Side of
Chicago; there needs to be some
adjustment to the automated sys-
tem that might wrongfully deny
that buyer access to credit.
If credit scoring is going to be a
factor in credit decisions for the
foreseeable future, models that
more adequately assess mortgage
risk need to be developed and put
into general use. Scoring system
developers need to develop
methodologies that are more
responsive to a borrower’s positive
credit behavior and that incorpo-
rate some of the more subjective,
but very relevant, data that often
factor into a human being’s deci-
sion about someone’s creditworthi-
ness.
Underwriting and Training Policies
with Respect to Credit Scoring
Lending institutions clearly need
to do a better job of training their
personnel about the purpose and
limitations of credit scores. I do
not suggest that underwriters be
divested of the capacity to over-
ride a credit-scored decision.
However, excessive overrides raise
serious concerns about disparate
treatment of borrowers. Access to
credit for a borrower who is qual-
ified by a credit score (even mar-
ginally) should not be denied
because of the underwriter’s or
loan officer’s personal assessment
of the borrower’s gender, ethnicity,
lifestyle, personality, tempera-
ment, family connections, and the
like. Human nature being what it
is, a lending policy allowing for
“high-side” overrides—in which an
applicant’s score suggests they
deserve a loan yet they are denied
it—opens the door to potential
misuse, and I do not believe a
responsible lending institution
would either tolerate such deci-
sions or accept such liability.
Second review of all adverse
actions should be standard operat-
ing procedure for lending institu-
While a scoring system may be developed on the basis of
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tions, both to ensure fair and equal
access to credit and to ensure that
acceptable business opportunities
are not missed. For lenders that
offer subprime products, I would
suggest that their second review be
conducted in the context of trying
to qualify their customers for a
conventional product. Lending
staff involved in second reviews
should have special training in the
use of credit scores, including some
education about how scores are
developed, what a score is designed
to predict, and what factors in a
borrower’s credit history will affect
the score (either positively or nega-
tively). The scoring-system devel-
opers are key in this process, and
an acceptable middle ground must
be struck between protecting their
proprietary systems and educating
lenders on the use and limitations
of credit scoring.
In summary, access to credit con-
tinues to be a critical need in many
LMI communities. The recent
increase in the homeownership
rate in this country indicates that
there is a large population striving
to be homeowners and making
some progress to achieve that goal.
To the extent that credit-scoring
technology has made this possible,
that is very positive. However,
lenders, especially those who have
developed their own credit-scoring
model on the basis of their own
experience and portfolios, must
maintain and upgrade the credit-
scoring model in the same way
that they maintain other systems.
Maintenance and regular upgrades
of credit-scoring models to reflect
market conditions should be part
of the business plan and evaluated
on a regular basis. Such evaluation
should include an analysis of the
performance of credit-scored loans
versus those that were overridden,
and especially an analysis of the
performance of those credit-scored
loans that were identified as mar-
ginal. Just as no institution would
attempt to run its business with
outdated hardware, it should not
be using an outdated scoring
model to direct credit decisions.
What can lenders do to ensure that
the credit-scoring models they
develop or purchase will accurate-
ly predict the performance of their
applicant base?
For the successful use of predic-
tive scoring models in the credit
decision-making process, the
models must be based on similar
products, environments, and pop-
ulations. In addition, the attrib-
utes and application of the criteria
parameters in the models must be
refreshed routinely to ensure that
the applications produce results
consistent with the expectations
when the models were developed
or purchased.
Model use is a two-step process.
First, the lender must select the right
model for the loan product. Second,
the lender must consistently refine
the model, which requires dedicat-
ing resources long after original
development. This refinement
requirement can be easy to ignore,
especially in the early stages of a
product rollout when there is little
product performance to point to as
indicators of performance shortfalls.
However, this initial stage is the
time when even more due diligence
needs to be devoted to fine tune the
model and avoid unintended results.
Higher than anticipated pull-
through rates2 or adverse action
rates are early indicators that the
model has serious flaws requiring
immediate attention. 
Most purchased credit-scoring
models have solid data to support
their predictability. In addition, the
best model vendors require lenders
to supply the results of their expe-
rience so the vendor can improve
and enhance its own data for
future models. This feedback
improves the quality of the predic-
tive factors and model fairness.
Consistent feedback is part of the
model-refreshing process; howev-
er, modification of the model crite-
ria by the lender can degrade the
model’s results. 
Lenders who develop their own
models often need to compensate
for their small population per-
formance base by comparing
experience for an extended time,
and even more care should be
given to reviewing results during
the initial product rollout.
Comparing customer performance
results, as well as application
approval and pull-through rates,
will yield richer data. These data
will help the user identify fairness
issues (adverse impact), adverse
selection (capturing undesired
applications), and low pull-
through (closing) rates that could
indicate a competitive disadvan-
tage of the product.
Senior management and boards of
directors should be wary of
“proxy-like” models, either in-
house or purchased from a vendor,
that were developed for a loan
product or population somewhat
similar to another lender’s product
or population. Because such simi-
larities can be hard to define, this
practice can have disastrous
results in both fairness to appli-
cants and the bottom line.
Management should perform ade-
quate due diligence on the criteria
and, if not convinced, employ out-
side resources to provide evalua-
tion and recommendations related
to the model.
What steps might lenders take to
effectively update and maintain
their models?
As I stated previously, most model
vendors insist that lenders provide
specific information related to
model performance, including
applications received, approval
rates, pull-through rates, and serv-
icing results. These data will also
provide the lender3 with informa-
tion that can be employed to
change the criteria of the lender’s
model, product price, collateral
value (if included in the model),
population attributes, brokers or
mortgage bankers who bring
Thomas P. Fitzgibbon, Jr., 
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applications to the lender, and
other levers, in order to achieve
the desired results. 
Most lenders employ models to
develop results based on return on
assets (ROA) objectives, under-
standing there will be losses in
any model that is employed. Loan
pricing should reflect perform-
ance expectations and results.
Therefore, consistent review of
pricing (rate, fees, and so on) will
be necessary to achieve the ROA
and to ensure that the pricing
reflects the risks associated with
the population and security char-
acteristics, thus ensuring fairness
to all populations.
Lenders who develop their own
models need to take steps to con-
sistently review adverse actions:
comparing protected-class appli-
cants to the applicant pool,
reviewing approval and pull-
through rates related to the
expectations, and comparing the
servicing results to the ROA pro-
jections. Deviations from model
projections should guide the
lender to change the model,
including credit score (FICO,
Delphi, and the like), loan-to-
value categories, applicant attrib-
utes, and vendors (if used).
In the initial stages of the product
rollout, the lender needs to review
early performance indicators that
do not meet the expectations of
the design phase. Even small indi-
cators of performance shortfalls,
such as low application rates from
prohibited basis groups, higher-
than-expected adverse action
Automated technologies in credit-
granting institutions have ex-
panded dramatically in the past
10 years and credit-scoring appli-
cations are now common. These
applications aid significantly in
the effort to streamline origina-
tion processes and cut costs while
delivering consistent and objec-
tive decisions about an applicant’s
creditworthiness. Scoring models
relate an applicant’s past credit
performance and current financial
characteristics to future debt
repayment. They are often charac-
terized as generic or custom.
Generic scores are created to be
predictive of delinquency for
generic consumer debt, using
large amounts of credit data.
Custom scores are designed to be
predictive of repayment perform-
ance for specific types of credit or
perhaps for a specific lender’s
customer base. With custom
scores, additional non-credit-
report information may be used in
the modeling effort. Regardless of
who builds a scoring model, there
are common considerations in the
development process and mainte-
nance of the model.
Follow a Clear and Explainable
Development Process 
Scoring-model development occurs
with the coordination of market
analysts, credit-risk managers,
statisticians, database administra-
tors, and computer programmers.
Each part of the process must be
carefully planned to ensure devel-
opment and implementation of a
successful model.
• Objective
The first step in the technical
development of a scoring model is
to determine what measure of per-
formance to model. Models may
predict the probability of default
(nonperforming loans that termi-
nate and do not prepay in full), the
probability of becoming delin-
quent, the financial losses an
institution expects for each loan,
or some combination of delin-
Alex Stricker,
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rates (especially where protected-
class populations are concerned),
or lower-than-expected pull-
through rates, are indications that
the model may have flaws that
need to be addressed. 
What methods should lenders
employ to monitor the performance
of their credit-scored loans, partic-
ularly with respect to the fairness
and accuracy of their models?
The methods lenders should
employ include the following:
• Due diligence review of all
adverse actions to ensure that the
model is applied correctly, 
• Comparative analysis of adverse
actions to evaluate model results
on protected-class applicants,
• Comparison of computer records
(data input) with application sam-
pling to ensure quality control,
• Review of any subjective deci-
sion-making performed on scored
applications that changes the
model decision or modifies the
pricing or product parameters, and
• Review of closed-loan packages
(quality control) to ensure that the
loan parameters approved are the
same as the parameters in the
closed loan.
Consistency and diligence are
imperative in developing and using
credit-scoring models. Early indi-
cations of performance that are dif-
ferent than predicted allow action
to be taken early in the process to
change the model parameters and
modify elements that caused the
deviations. Vendors and lenders
need to stay alert to changes and
intervene quickly.
Senior management and boards of directors should be wary
of “proxy-like” models, either in-house or purchased from
a vendor, that were developed for a loan product or popula-
tion somewhat similar to another lender’s product or popu-
lation. Because such similarities can be hard to define, this
practice can have disastrous results in both fairness to
applicants and the bottom line.16 c & b
quency, default, and losses. A
lender that uses another compa-
ny’s underwriting system to make
loans to hold in its portfolio
should be aware of the implica-
tions of the scoring model objec-
tives for lending patterns. For
example, models designed to pre-
dict serious mortgage delinquency
tend to place more importance on
past-credit-history variables than
models designed to predict default.
By contrast, mortgage default
models give more weight to loan-
to-value ratios.
• Data Collection and Sample Design
The data available for use in statis-
tical modeling are the single most
important technical element of
model development. Lender data
retention is crucial for model con-
struction and testing. Typically, the
more information available, the
more precise the results can be.
Lenders developing their own sys-
tem are best served by data that
come not only from their existing
customer base but also from other
segments of the market that repre-
sent potential applicants. The
selection of risk factors included in
a scoring model is determined in
part by their availability to the
modeler. Therefore, it is vital to
capture and retain as much origi-
nation and subsequent perform-
ance information as possible.  
After a sample has been construct-
ed, the scoring limitations created
by the available data sample need
to be identified. For example, at
this time, Fannie Mae’s Desktop
Underwriter does not process 95
percent loan-to-value ratio refi-
nance loans with a cash-out com-
ponent on non-owner-occupied,
three- to four-unit housing. Our
experience with this product is
currently too limited to model, but
as we learn more and acquire more
data, the risk of this product may
become better understood and be
modeled appropriately.
• Statistical Tools
Most scoring applications predict
the likelihood of an event. Many
statistical tools are available. For
example, default probabilities can
be estimated by means of logistic
regression. The logistic procedure,
well known and understood by
economists, is fast and straightfor-
ward to implement. The specific
tool chosen depends on the goal of
the scoring model and any defi-
ciencies in the development sam-
ple. In the case of sample deficien-
cy, data-augmentation methods
are available to improve estima-
tion on thin samples, as are proce-
dures to account for potential bias-
es stemming from missing infor-
mation. The result of a scoring
model is the generation of a score-
card. Thus, the scorecard’s combi-
nation of points may be influenced
by the statistical tools and methods
employed in the model.   
• Validation and Testing
A variety of statistical tests are
available to aid in the validation of
a model. No single test provides a
complete answer. Fannie Mae has
estimated hundreds of models,
with all potential variables, divid-
ed and clustered, to yield the sta-
tistically strongest model. The typ-
ical measures of qualitative-
dependent-variable modeling are
used, such as gini coefficients, K-S
statistics, and concordance. The
overall idea is that the model must
do the very best job of separating
high-risk and low-risk loans. Since
many model variations may be
tested using several criteria, it is
important to have rules for what
constitutes a more predictive
model. Equally important is how
well the model predicts for sub-
groups of the intended population.
For example, does a model
designed to predict delinquency
for borrowers of all income levels
produce an appropriate ordering of
risk when it is applied only to low-
income borrowers? The answer
depends in part on how diverse the
development data are with respect
to income. Testing a model’s differ-
ential validity is necessary before
implementing it in production.
• Cutoffs and Overrides
During model development, atten-
tion should be given to determin-
ing how much risk to tolerate. The
model itself may predict how like-
ly default is for a particular loan.
However, consideration must be
given to how much collective cred-
it risk the company is willing to
take. This is determined by market
analysis of likely application vol-
umes, the length of time loans are
expected to stay in the book of
business, capital requirements, and
pricing and revenue targets. A
periodic review of these targets is
necessary to ensure that the
approved mix of business contin-
ues to meet revenue objectives.   
Limits within the scoring engine
can be reached if the scoring
model tries to evaluate values for
certain risk factors that are
improbable in the scorecard appli-
cation. At Fannie Mae, our system
filters out for manual review all
applicants with total debt-to-
income ratios greater than 65 per-
cent. The Desktop Underwriter
program refers the application to
the underwriter to determine
whether the data were entered
incorrectly or if the relatively high
A lender that uses another company’s underwriting system to make
loans to hold in its portfolio should be aware of the implications of
the scoring model objectives for lending patterns. For example,
models designed to predict serious mortgage delinquency tend to
place more importance on past-credit-history variables than mod-
els designed to predict default. By contrast, mortgage default mod-
els give more weight to loan-to-value ratios.17 c & b
debt-to-income ratio is manage-
able for the applicant.  
• Monitor Application Decisions 
Is the production-decision process
working in a way similar to the
process tested? Generic creditwor-
thiness scores might be used only
in part to make a decision, so it is
important to keep track of how
these scores relate to the final
decision. Custom systems may be
used to support a comprehensive
evaluation of applications and to
monitor who is being approved or
denied at the recommendation of
the automated-scoring system. At
Fannie Mae, we have monthly
reports on applications through
our Desktop Underwriter system.
We examine the system’s recom-
mendations across various finan-
cial and demographic characteris-
tics. When changes or irregulari-
ties are observed, more detailed
examination follows. Such moni-
toring is vital to remedy problems
or irregularities.
• Monitor Performance
Regardless of what the system is
designed to predict, performance
can be tracked from one month
after origination. The most impor-
tant report will show how loan
performance varies by the scoring
system’s recommendation. Are the
approved loans performing differ-
ently than the loans made with an
automated recommendation for
further review? If generic scores
were used in the decision to make
the loan, are higher-scored loans
performing better than lower-
scored loans? Other analysis
should focus more narrowly on
loans scoring near the cutoff to be
This concludes the second article of Perspectives on Credit
Scoring and Fair Mortgage Lending. The Federal Reserve System’s
Mortgage Credit Partnership Credit Scoring Committee thanks the
respondents for their participation. The next article will explore
how lenders monitor the practices of their third-party brokers,
especially for compliance with fair-lending laws, pricing policies,
and the use of credit-scoring models.
sure that those marginal loans are
performing as expected. A com-
plete examination will involve
tracking performance for numer-
ous loan subsets across product,
financial, demographic, and geo-
graphic segments of the market.
The particular array of reports
depends on the financial institu-
tion’s lending goals and regulatory
requirements. Simple reporting,
done regularly and completely, will
alert management, marketing per-
sonnel, and model developers to
potential problems and areas to
investigate further.
Model Evolution 
Expect to update your model.
Experience will improve the effec-
tiveness of a scoring system. As
such, the development process
must be flexible to allow for
changes suggested through the
learning. At Fannie Mae we are
continuously investigating and
developing new models. Every new
model we generate is an evolution
of the model it replaces.
Approximately annually, the
Desktop Underwriter scorecard is
reestimated to utilize additional
performance data that come with
the passage of time and variation
in the economy. There is no secret
formula for success. Able statisti-
cal analysis is necessary to gener-
ate a system. Its success requires
the coordination of market analy-
sis, data retention and reporting,
and skilled risk managers.
Endnotes
1. The Fair Housing Act prohibits
discrimination based on race or
color; national origin; religion;
sex; familial status (defined as
children under the age of 18 living
with a parent or legal custodian,
pregnant women, and people
securing custody of children under
18); and handicap. The Equal
Credit Opportunity Act prohibits
discrimination based on race,
color, religion, national origin, sex,
marital status, or age (provided
that the applicant has the capacity
to enter into a binding contract).
Credit cannot be denied because
any of the applicant’s income
derives from a public assistance
program or because the applicant
has, in good faith, exercised any
right under the Consumer Credit
Protection Act or any state law
upon which an exemption has
been granted by the Board.
2. The ratio of applications to the
number of actual closed loans. For
example, if the lender anticipates a
45 percent pull-through rate and
gets a 75 percent pull-through
rate, it means either that the model
is too loose in credit-quality
framework or that the prospective
customer was not well-understood
by the creator of the model. High
pull-through rates usually mean
“adverse selection” and could bode
trouble for the lender in the servic-
ing end of the business. Similarly,
higher than anticipated adverse-
action rates could mean that the
credit quality is too tight and
freezes out qualified customers.
3. The lender controls the modifi-
cations to the scoring model and,
with the vendor’s help (informa-
tion feedback), the lender can
make modifications that produce





n December 4, 2000,
Microsoft donated $100
million in cash and soft-
ware to the Boys & Girls Clubs
of America to bring technology
access and programs to more
than 3.3 million underserved
young people. This is one indi-
cation that the information-
technology (IT) industry recog-
nizes the need for more workers
in the field and that it is opti-
mistic that those workers can
come from low- to moderate-
income populations.1 Many
other organizations that are
smaller than Microsoft are
working to broaden information
technology know-how of people
of low to moderate income. This
article profiles some of the pro-
grams these profit, nonprofit,
and government organizations
are using to bring technology
and opportunity for digital
careers to untapped, and often
underserved, markets. 
One goal of these programs is
to help produce middle-income
earners. In addition, they better
equip people to keep up with... 
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and those who are unemployed or
on welfare. The program provides
free classes ranging from desktop
publishing to web development.
Applicants to the program must
have a General Equivalency
Diploma (GED) and basic computer
skills such as knowing how to save
a file. Chief Executive Officer Joe
Hawkins says, “If we can identify
shoe shiners and homeless moms
and train them to work at excellent
paying jobs in less than six weeks,
then that should send a message to
the country that it can be done.”
According to Mr. Hawkins, “We
need to be able to look to talent
within our own communities to
meet the need [of this labor short-
age].” The program has three com-
ponents: EntryNet delivers five
weeks of web design, job-readiness
and project-management training,
and an orientation to the new
media industry; InterNet provides
on-the-job experience with paid
internships in new media compa-
nies; and SupportNet promotes
success and long-term career
development with training
stipends, counseling, financial life-
support subsidies, job placement
assistance, continuous training,
tutoring, mentorships, scholar-
ships, and peer-group support.
To date, OpNet has trained over
200 people and approximately 50
to 55 percent of its graduates
either have full-time jobs in the
industry or are working on con-
tract assignments; 10 percent
have pursued advanced educa-
tion. Average annual post-intern-
ship income has increased 165
percent, from $11,500 to $30,500.
Prior to program entry, 59 per-
cent of interns had household
income classified by the U.S.
Department of Housing and
Urban Development as very low,
and 41 percent as extremely low.
Thirty-four percent of the stu-
dents are African-American, 24
percent Latinos, 24 percent
Asians, and approximately 18
percent Caucasians or from bira-
cial backgrounds. 
OpNet uses an advisory board,
made up of approximately 25
industry professionals, to help
shape curriculum and keep the
program in line with industry
our culture’s increasing reliance
on IT, from applying for mortgage
loans online to participating in
distance-learning programs. They
work to diminish the digital
divide—the gap between individu-
als and communities who have
access to and can effectively use
new information and communica-
tions tools, such as the Internet,
and those who cannot. The fol-
lowing examples illustrate what
some local and national organiza-
tions are doing to bring digital
technology and IT job skills to
untapped markets. 
CitySoft, Inc. 
CitySoft is a for-profit web devel-
opment and web services company
with a social mission. Founder
Nicholas Gleason works to empow-
er people from urban communities
by giving them job opportunities in
the IT industry. Individuals hired by
CitySoft are hired “70 percent
based on their attitude and 30 per-
cent based on their ability,” says
Allison Devore, Vice President of
Business Development. She adds
that the company recruits talent by
maintaining relationships with
chosen urban training programs
whose administrators identify can-
didates who might succeed at
CitySoft. In their New York City
office, 90 percent of their web
developers have come from
“Playing to Win” in Harlem and
Universal Business Media School in
New York City. CitySoft has used
the South End Technology Center
in Massachusetts to fill positions in
their Cambridge office. (They also
have an office in Baltimore.)
New hires initially become non-
paid “apprentices” and are given
specific tasks to test their abilities
and grow their skills learned in
training programs. Within two to
three weeks of completing their
assignment, apprentices meet with
their supervisors for evaluation. If
the apprentice enjoys the work and
potential career, and if the supervi-
sor is pleased with the apprentice’s
work, then the apprentice is grad-
uated to a paid-intern position
where he or she begins working on
projects for which the company
has paying clients. CitySoft’s first
contract, the creation of The
Boston Globe’s website Boston.com,
was created by a developer who
had gone through an urban train-
ing program. 
To promote continuous improve-
ment, employees are offered a
variety of programming language
classes such as Cold Fusion,
Photoshop, and JavaScript. The
program seems to be working—
CitySoft hires and retains 90 per-
cent of its employees from urban




CitySkills is a national nonprofit
organization working primarily
with IT training programs and
Internet employers. It provides
services and advocacy focused on
improving training programs that
prepare low-income urban adults
for web development careers.
CitySkills’ audience includes work-
force development organizations,
community-based nonprofits, and
other job-training institutions. 
CitySkills also shows nonprofit
organizations that have traditional-
ly provided job training for indus-
tries such as office administration
and financial services how to retool
their existing infrastructure to focus
training on technology-driven
career paths. Director Michael
Margolis (who co-founded the
organization with Nick Gleason)
says that successful nonprofit train-
ing programs are “entrepreneurial,
employer-driven, have strong lead-
ership, and have very strong cross-
sector partnerships.” One of
CitySkills’ initiatives is with YMCA
Training Inc., which has been in
Boston for 17 years and has placed
2,600 people in office administra-
tion jobs. CitySkills has partnered
with them to create a web design
job training pilot and help YMCA
Training Inc. better understand the
IT industry’s talent needs.
OpNet
OpNet, a nonprofit, multimedia
training institute based in San
Francisco, provides an intensive
five-week training program that
targets low-income young adultsneeds. Initial program funding
relied on credit provided by the
Local Economic Assistance
Program, a venture capitalist firm.
Today, they use large government
grants to help fund the program.
La Alianza Hispana, Inc.
La Alianza Hispana is a nonprofit,
multiservice agency serving Latino
communities in the Roxbury and
Dorchester areas of Boston. It pro-
vides a wide variety of programs
and services, such as English as a
Second Language, GED classes, and
public health programs. Ms. Shirley
Roderick, Program Manager of
the Employment and Training
Department at La Alianza Hispana,
says that the institution’s ultimate
goal is to help community mem-
bers improve their quality of life.
Ms. Roderick believes that the
Latino community has been falling
The Visually Impaired: Working Toward Inclusion in the Internet Age
Mr. Curtis Chong, Director of Technology at the
National Federation of the Blind in Washington,
DC, thinks that economics is the issue causing a
digital divide in the visually impaired community.
He says that for visually impaired individuals to
use the Internet, they must attach a third-party
piece of software (adaptable to Windows only),
called a screen access program, to the comput-
er. At present, five or six programs are on the
market, ranging in price from $500 to $1,000
or more. These program take screen information
and convert it into speech. Those who are able
to afford it can purchase a display that converts
the data on the screen into Braille. According to
Mr. Chong, most computer stores are unaware of
this software or do not stock it. There is also the
issue of training and education. Says Mr.
Chong, “When visually impaired people access
the Internet, they do so using a keyboard, not a
mouse, and so a program that forces you to use
the mouse for every single function is inaccessi-
ble to the blind.” Employers who rely on soft-
ware that requires use of a mouse damage job
prospects for blind people. Because training
resources are not available in the general com-
munity, most visually impaired individuals who
learn keyboard access to the Internet are self-
taught, like Mr. Chong.
Mr. Chong is delighted that the government has
drawn a lot of attention to the plight of the visu-
ally impaired in the digital divide; however, the
National Federation of the Blind is not waiting for
the government to solve all of their problems.
They currently plan to construct and operate a
National Research and Training Institute that will
develop new directions and trends in research,
some of which will be in high technology.
behind in the information age
because many are unable to afford
a computer and do not have access
to the Internet. In an effort to
bridge this gap, the employment
and training department incorpo-
rates the use of technology in its
various course offerings. Some
examples of those courses are PC
technician training and Microsoft
applications. One of the classes
teaches office skills and focuses on
job searching via the Internet. Ms.
Roderick plans to move the tech-
nology training to more advanced
levels in the near future. The
agency maintains an up-to-date
listing of all the job openings
within the area and often refers
students to jobs that they hear
about. The agency also has a strong
internship program. Students who
succeed in classes get promoted to
a paid position at the agency. Ms.
Roderick says that one former stu-
dent now does the agency’s PC
support and another student net-
worked the agency’s computers
before leaving for a more lucrative
position. The agency is also
involved in a Technology Goes
Home collaboration discussed on
the next page.
Although La Alianza Hispana has
been fortunate to receive dona-
tions of computer hardware and
software from the Timothy Smith
Foundation and Lotus/IBM
Corporation, funding remains a
problem. They continue to have
difficulty attracting and keeping
qualified, bilingual instructors to
teach IT classes because the
instructors are able to make more
money in the private sector. To
mitigate this problem, they have
established a collaboration with
Northeastern University’s Coop-
erative Education Department. 
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The High Tech
Demonstration Program
The High Technology Demonstra-
tion Program, run by the City of
Boston’s Office of Jobs and
Community Service, is a free pro-
gram that caters to dislocated
workers, primarily women and
minorities, between the ages of 40
and 45. For the past two years the
High Technology Demonstration
Program, with grant partner Metro
Southwest, a workforce develop-
ment agency in the Norwood area,
has been offering PC support train-
ing through two of its group-train-
ing vendors. Executive Director
Dave Bassett says that 100 individ-
uals were trained in the program,
and 85 percent were able to obtain
jobs in the high tech industry. The
majority of these people had no
previous high tech experience. The
PC-support training-skills program
was set at a ninth-grade reading
and math level with basic comput-
er literacy recommended. Mr.
Bassett plans to raise the bar to a
tenth-grade reading and math
level with stronger computer skills
required of individuals seeking to
gain admittance to the network
administration and the web design
programs. The High Tech
Demonstration Program has a job
referral component, with group-
training vendors Clark University
and Bay State School of
Technology responsible for placing
people upon program completion. 
Mr. Bassett says that while there is
a skill shortage across the board, it
remains a challenge to train indi-
viduals so that they can gain the
skills that are necessary to secure a
job. The program keeps abreast of
market trends and labor needs by
using an advisory board (repre-
senting several local employers) as
a resource. It was the advisory
board who recommended that the
program target women, minorities,
and mid-career workers, since they
felt that they were the groups most
underrepresented in the workforce. 
Technology Goes Home
A survey conducted by the
Mayor’s office in 1996 revealed
that only one in 10 children in
Boston’s public schools had a
computer in their home. Following
this survey, the Mayor’s office
convened a series of meetings at
City Hall with business leaders to
figure out how to improve the sit-
uation. As a result of the meetings,
and an initial donation of 1,000
computers, the Technology Goes
Home Program was born. In the
program, families receive new
computers upon completion of a
computer-training program. The
goals of the Technology Goes
Home Program are to encourage
enhanced employment opportuni-
ties for adults, improved academic
performance for children, commu-
nity collaboration and coopera-
tion, and creation of Internet com-
munities within and between
neighborhoods. Mr. Steve Gag,
Executive Director for the pro-
gram, says that it seeks to ensure
that every family of a public-
school student, and primarily
those of low to moderate income,




Although efforts are under way to
bridge the divide and to include
more low-income individuals in
the field of information technolo-
gy, the recent downturn in the dot-
com economy has left fewer posi-
tions available for entry-level
workers, particularly those coming
out of short-term training pro-
grams such as the ones featured in
this article. As of February 12,
2001, over 55,000 individuals have
been laid off in the dot-com indus-
try.2 A December article in The
New York Times titled “A Black
Woman Crosses the ‘Digital Divide’
And Gets Stranded” tracks the
career of a former student of
OpNet’s six-week training pro-
gram, and the difficulties she has
experienced trying to find a job
since being let go by her former
employer, a San Francisco start-up
Internet company called ShopTok.
According to the article, “The
majority of the tens of thousands
of workers laid off in the dot-com
downturn are the lower-wage,
entry-level workers who can least
afford to lose their jobs.” 
The market for IT professionals
such as computer scientists, com-
puter engineers, systems analysts,
and computer programmers who
possess special skills still remains
strong, however, and it is projected
to grow considerably over the next
five years, from 1.5 million in 1996
to 2.6 million in 2006.3 Knowledge
of information technology tools
and services will be an essential
feature of the twenty-first century,
from accessing online-banking
services to searching the web for
job opportunities. Fortunately, pro-
grams like the ones described in
this article provide many low- and
moderate-income people with
motivation and the first step
toward opportunity in the IT indus-
try, possibly leading toward their
attainment of further skills.
Endnotes
1. The demand for IT workers has
grown with the increase in the
Internet, networked computers, e-
commerce, and digitized products
and services. According to a January
2001 report Measuring the Internet
Economy, available at <www.inter-
netindicators.com/jan_2001.pdf>,
“The Internet Economy now directly
supports more than 3.088 million
workers . . . more than the number
employed by the insurance industry
(2.36 million workers) and double the
real estate industry (1.5 million).” 
2. www.theStandard.com
3. Carol Ann Meares and John F.
Sargent, Jr., “The Digital Workforce:
Building Infotech Skills at the Speed
of Innovation,” U.S. Department of
Commerce, Office of Technology
Policy, June 1999.
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